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We examine how households protected their livelihood against an unexpected negative shock 
caused by the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). We also compare HPAI with other 
shocks such as sickness, ceremonial events, typhoons, floods, droughts, and unemployment.  
We apply the augmented testing framework of the canonical consumption risk-sharing 
hypothesis developed by Fafchamps and Lund (2003) to our unique household panel data that 
was collected in two Vietnamese villages exclusively for this study. While we reject the full 
consumption risk-sharing hypothesis strongly, our empirical results reveal that informal credit 
transactions played an important role for those affected by HPAI in coping with the unforeseen 
negative asset shock that it created. Moreover, our result suggests that the informal and/or 
formal insurance network against an unforeseen event has been strengthened after awhile. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (hereafter, HPAI) was first identified in 
Vietnam in 2003, it has become endemic to the country (WHO, 2006). Especially during the 
period from December 2003 to January 2004, the disease spread to 57 of Vietnam’s 64 
provinces, where it prompted the culling of 44 million birds (Samman, Son, and Trung, 2006). 
These losses amounted to about 1.8% of Vietnam’s GDP in 2004 (MARD and MOH, 2006).
1  
Since poultry is an important source of income and nutrition for small farmers in rural areas, 
HPAI is likely to affect the poor disproportionately (Dawkins, 2005; World Bank, 2005).  
While there are plenty of existing veterinary or epidemiological studies on HPAI, there has been 
no quantitative study on the impact of HPAI on people’s livelihood. The lack of appropriate data 
constrained such an analysis. In order to bridge this gap in the existing literature, we employ a 
unique dataset that was collected in Vietnam exclusively for this study and investigate how 
households protected their livelihoods against an unexpected negative shock caused by HPAI.   
In micro-development economics, there has been remarkable progress in the 
theoretical and empirical literature on risk and household behavior (Fafchamps, 2003; Dercon 
ed., 2005). While the social impacts of man-made disasters, such as financial crises, have been 
examined widely (Frankenberg, et al., 2003; Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002; Ravallion and 
Lokshin, 2005; Kang and Sawada, 2008, 2009; McKenzie, 2003, 2004, 2006), shocks generated 
by natural disasters have rarely been investigated or utilized, mainly due to data constraints 
(Skoufias, 2003; Sawada, 2007; Ichimura, Sawada, and Shimizutani, 2007; Sawada and 
Shimizutani, 2008, Yang, 2008; Shoji, 2009). As an unexpected, exogenous event, HPAI 
provides an unusual, clean experimental situation under which we are able to investigate the 
functioning of markets and the way in which households respond to exogenous shocks. In other 
                                                  
1 There has been a concern that the virus appears to be mutating in a way that facilitates its 
transmission. As such, in addition to its direct impact on the poultry sector, HPAI poses an 
increasing threat to human health. The highest number of human deaths was recorded in 
Vietnam until the middle of 2006.   - 3 - 
words, we exploited this event, which households are unable to influence, as an exogenous 
instrumental variable to identify the effectiveness of formal and informal insurance on 
households’ livelihood. Such an economic study on HPAI is important in order to uncover 
human behavior against epidemics and to develop effective insurance policies, because most of 
the existing studies on HPAI have been conducted from an epidemiological perspective.   
In this paper, we use unique data collected exclusively for this project to investigate 
two issues on the impact of HPAI: first, we compare consumption smoothing patterns between 
the affected and the non-affected families using the framework of full consumption risk sharing 
(Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; Townsend, 1994); and second, we investigate household 
risk-coping behavior against the shocks generated by HPAI and other events.   
As an unexpected, exogenous event, HPAI provides an unusual & clean experimental 
situation under which we can test the complete consumption insurance hypothesis. We apply the 
canonical empirical strategy of consumption risk sharing following Cochrane (1991), Mace 
(1991), Townsend (1994), Altonji et al (1997), Ogaki and Zang (2001), and Ligon (2008) to our 
unique data on HPAI in Vietnam. These existing studies typically use income changes as their 
shock variables. However those variables are not necessarily exogenous to a household, 
resulting in possible estimation biases arising from endogeneity, measurement error, and/or 
private information problems (Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997; 
Dubois, Jullien, and Magnac, 2008). Our findings are less susceptible to econometric problems 
since we tested consumption reaction to direct shocks caused by an unexpected, large, and 
verifiable event that cannot be affected by households.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical and 
empirical framework for our analysis; Section 3 contains data and descriptive statistics, which is 
followed by empirical results in Section 4. The final section summarizes concluding remarks.     
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2.  The Model 
We follow Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Ligon (2001), and Townsend (1994) to 
formulate a canonical model of full consumption insurance in a pure exchange economy without 
storage. We consider an insurance network economy composed of N infinitely-lived households, 
each facing serially independent income draws. The Pareto-optimal consumption allocation 
problem of a hypothetical social planner becomes the Negishi-weighted utility maximization 
subject to the economy’s goods market equilibrium condition. The optimal condition implies 
that under full insurance, idiosyncratic household income changes should be absorbed by all 
other members in the same insurance network, and those shocks should not affect changes in 
consumption so that the expected value of weighted marginal utility is equalized across 
households.  
We postulate several further assumptions. First, we assume that durable and 
non-durable consumption goods are additive and separable. Second, we suppose that all 
households can observe uncertainty realizations exactly. In other words, there is no private 
information and thus information structure is symmetric. This assumption may not be as bad as 
it looks because the damages due to HPAI are largely observable in the insurance network. 
Third, we impose a technical assumption that the contingent securities span the state space and 
thus markets are complete. Finally, we assume that the probability distribution of state 
realization and subjective discount rate are identical across households, i.e., households have 
identical beliefs and preferences about the future. Under these assumptions, the Pareto efficient 
allocation should satisfy that λ
i ∂u /∂cit = λ
j ∂u/∂cjt for all states where λ is the Negishi-weight of 
a social welfare function, u (•) is the concave instantaneous utility of a household, c is the 
household’s non-durable consumption, and i and j denote i-th and j-th households, respectively.     






d is durable consumption. Then, we have 
   - 5 - 

























1 1 . 
 
This equation (1) shows that the change in consumption should be constant across households, 
since individual idiosyncratic income risk can be completely absorbed by the rest of the 
population under the full risk-sharing regime (Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; and Townsend, 
1994).   
Households can protect their consumption from income shortfalls caused by HPAI and 
other hazards and unexpected events using a wide variety of risk-coping strategies, which are 
defined as ex post strategies, to reduce consumption fluctuations provided income fluctuations 
are due to these ex-post risks (Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Fafchamps, 2003). In general, the 
existing literature identified the following different ways of employing risk-coping mechanisms 
through self-insurance and/or mutual-insurance schemes.   
Here we present five different risk-coping methods. First, households can reduce 
luxury or unnecessary consumption expenditure while maintaining a necessary consumption 
level, such as a minimum calorie or nutrition intake. Second, households can use credit to 
smooth consumption by reallocating future resources to today’s consumption. Third, households 
can accumulate financial and physical assets as a precautionary device against unexpected 
income shortfalls. Fourth, additional adult or child labor incomes through labor market 
participation are often used as a risk-coping device. In other words, returns to human capital can 
be used as a risk-coping device. Finally, receiving emergency private and/or public transfers is a 
form of risk coping. 
  In order to incorporate these risk-coping strategies into our empirical framework, we 
consider the following intertemporal budget constraints of households: 
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where p
r represents private transfers from relatives and friends, b is borrowing from formal and 
informal sources including microfinance programs, p
b represents public transfers, Δw  is net 
dis-saving,  Δd  is the amount of livestock damages caused by HPAI, and F is a residual 
component that includes family labor income and self-production. We follow Fafchamps and 
Lund (2003) to combine Equations (3) and (4) to obtain: 
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This equation (3) indicates that households can utilize private and public transfers, borrowings, 
and dis-saving as risk coping strategies against livestock damages caused by HPAI, Δd.   
 
Two Econometric Specifications 
There are two sets of econometric analyses implemented in our paper. First, we test the 
complete consumption insurance hypothesis by employing the empirical strategy of Cochrane 
(1991) and Mace (1991). It should be noted that our empirical analysis does not limit us from 
testing the existence of formal insurance markets. Instead, we examine the validity of a wide 
variety of formal and informal insurance mechanisms, such as borrowing and receiving private 
and/or public transfers against an earthquake [Mace (1991)]. From equation (3), we have the 
following estimable equation: 
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where c
n is the money inflow represented by the left-hand side of equation (3), αv is a village 
dummy variable, αi represents household fixed effects, and εit is a well-behaved error term.    We   - 7 - 
assume that the unobserved component, F, in equation (3) is captured by household fixed effects 
and the error term.   
By comparing Equation (3) with Equation (4), it should be clear that the null 
hypothesis of full risk-sharing is represented by the condition that α1= -1 and α2= 1.  The null 
hypothesis that α1= -1 is also considered to be a necessary condition. The intuition behind these 
restrictions should be clear. In order to smooth consumption against a decrease in income, y-c
d, 
or an increase in the degree of livestock damage, Δd, the exact same amount should be 
generated by risk-coping mechanisms represented by the money inflow, c
n, in Equation (4). If 
coefficients α1 and α2 are not statistically significant or of the right magnitude, it implies that the 
risk-sharing mechanisms do not function effectively. 
A major concern with estimating Equation (4) is in a possible correlation between the 
income variable, y-c
d, and error term, ε, because income and durable consumption may be a part 
of risk-coping strategies. Presumably, health shocks, funerals and other ceremonial events, 
unexpected loss of livestock, and HPAI infection variables are all exogenous, and thus can be 
employed as instrumental variables.   
As to the second econometric framework, we follow Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and 
investigate possible factors that inhibit consumption insurance by comparing the effectiveness 
of different risk-coping strategies, i.e., dis-saving as well as borrowing and receiving private 
and/or public transfers. Treating the second term on the right-hand side of Equation (4), y-c
d, as 
an endogenous variable and using instrumental variables, we postulate the following 
reduced-form equation: 
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where D is a matrix of instrumental variables such as health shocks, funerals and other 
ceremonial events, unexpected loss of livestock, and HPAI infection variables. Finally, we   - 8 - 
follow Fafchamps and Lund (2003) to estimate Equation (5) for each component of the 
left-hand-side variables. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We collected a unique dataset exclusively for our analysis in the Muonglai commune 
of Luc Yen District of Yen Bai province with a help of an NGO, Save the Children Japan (SCJ).   
The commune is located in a mountainous area about 183 kilometers from Hanoi (Figure 1).  
According to the Vietnam Health and Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) 2004, the total number 
of natural disasters and the average number of animal epidemics per community, including 
HPAI, are comparable to the rest of the nation (Table 1). 
The details of the data collection procedure in the Muonglai commune of Yen Bai 
province are described in Nose (2007). Fortunately, we can employ a baseline dataset collected 
by Gamada (2004) for the period between October 2003 and September 2004. Nose (2007) 
conducted a survey of the same households interviewed by Gamanda (2004). The incidence of 
poverty in this area was 46% in 2006, which is significantly higher than the national average of 
24% (JBIC, 2006). Hence, the sampled households were drawn from one of the poorest 
communities in Vietnam. In the baseline survey, Gamada (2004) selected two villages randomly 
from 20 villages in the Muonglai commune. In these villages, complete enumeration of all the 
households was attempted. The final sample size was composed of 136 households, which 
covers 79.5% of all households in the two villages. Nose (2006) conducted a follow-up survey 
with the same respondents in September 2006. Since Nose (2006) includes a retrospective 
module for the year 2005, we obtained a balanced panel dataset of 136 households that covers 
three years: the first round for October 2003 – September 2004; the second round for October 
2004 –September 2005; and, finally, October 2005 – September 2006. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the first round of the survey. The average age 
of respondents was 41 years and the average household size was 4.25 persons. As to the level of   - 9 - 
educational attainments, the majority of respondents were middle school graduates or lower: the 
proportion of those who completed middle school but not high school was 72.8%. As a poverty 
index, the proportion of official poverty card holders was 16.2% until the second round. This 
proportion increased to 29.0% in the third round, possibly because the government changed the 
eligibility criteria for the poverty card. The rate of land usufruct rights ownership was 
approximately  94  percent.   
Table 3 shows the distribution of ownership of different livestock, i.e., water buffalo, 
mother pig, hog, chicken and duck, during the first round of the survey. A majority of 
households own water buffaloes, pigs, chickens and/or ducks. Such a livestock portfolio is 
consistent with the pattern commonly found in Vietnam (Jonsen, 2002). More than 90 percent of 
households engage in chicken farming, indicating a prevalence of chicken farming in the area.  
While the average number of chickens has decreased since the HPAI incident occurred, still 
more than 90 percent of households continue to raise about 30 chickens on average. These 
chickens seem to be raised for own consumption purposes as well as for sale in the market.     
Table 4 summarizes a variety of shocks affecting households. In the first year, October 
2003- September 2004,19 households encountered the AI. There is a significant number of 
households that were subsequently affected by the AI again in the second and third rounds. 
Funerals and other ceremonial events can be regarded as negative shocks that cause sharp 
increases in expenditure. An average expenditure amounts to two million VND. Damage caused 
by typhoons, floods, and droughts can be found in these two villages. Typhoons and floods 
generate two types of shocks: negative income shocks and damage to land and other assets.  
The estimated damage to farmland and housing ranges from 0.5 million to 2 million VND.  
Sickness is a negative health shock that increases medical expenditure for necessary medication 
and treatments. The amount of such expenditure can be 2 million to 15 million VND.     
In Vietnam, the first case of HPAI was discovered in December 2003. In our sample, 
there were 19, 16, and 11 incidents of HPAI in the first, second, and third rounds, respectively   - 10 - 
(Table 5). Our data also reveals multiple damages. Table 5 shows estimated damages caused by 
HPAI that were computed as a product of the number of dead chickens and the unit market price.   
The damage amounted to around 20 percent of the total farm income. 
Next, we asked questions about potential sources of household risk-coping behavior 
against these damages (Table 6). First, households extensively utilized credits from two public 
financial institutions - Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP). The average loan size was about 6.3 million VND 
conditional on the land usufruct rights being used as collateral. Secondly, informal credits from 
relatives, friends, and neighbors were also used. Third, microfinance programs were introduced 
in 2003 by NGOs (Save the Children Japan in Vietnam, 2003; Save the Children Japan, 2004).  
In our sample, 36 households received loans of around 1.3 million VND, which were 
significantly smaller than loans from public sources. Fourth, casual labor participation was also 
used by around 40 percent of the households. Finally, cash or in-kind transfers from relatives 
and friends as well as governments were also important. The government has also been 
providing chicken immunization and land cleansing since 2004, but around 30 percent of the 
households in our sample that were affected by AI never received such benefits. Moreover, no 
household in our sample has ever received compensation for the loss of chickens, although 
ESARD (2004) indicates direct compensation for the AI victims.     
In Table 7, we compare risk-coping strategies between HPAI-affected and non-affected 
households. The affected households are less likely to receive formal credit and informal 
transfers, and more likely to borrow from informal sources, to participate in casual labor, to sell 
livestock, to participate in microfinance programs, and to receive public transfers.   
 
Is HPAI Shock Really Exogenous? 
In our econometric framework, we have treated the damages caused by HPAI as 
exogenous. Yet, it is not necessarily warranted that the use of HPAI variables gives a clean   - 11 - 
experimental dataset. Indeed, Martin (2004) implied that the commune level HPAI infection is 
determined by factors such as farmland size, poverty ratio, farm production level, and number 
of hogs. In order to test the validity of the exogeneity assumption of HPAI, we utilize the 
household-level information on HPAI infections. Our test strategy is simple: we regress an 
HPAI shock variable on a variety of observable variables such as household, asset, and 
livestock variables. As for dependent variables, we employ three variables: (1) a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one when a household encounters HPAI; (2) the number of 
dead chickens due to HPAI; and (3) the value of losses caused by HPAI.     
Table 8 shows the estimation results. Most coefficients are statistically insignificant. In 
fact, according to the joint test results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
are jointly zero. Admittedly, there are some statistically significant coefficients, such as the 
poverty card dummy and ownership of a color TV. In order to mitigate the possibility of 
estimation bias arising from these remaining effects, we included household-level variables 
and fixed effects in the risk-sharing tests and risk-coping equations. Hence, we believe that the 
exogeneity assumption of HPAI does not cause serious bias.     
 
4.  A Test of Full Consumption Risk-Sharing and the Determinants of Risk-Coping 
Strategies 
Table 9 shows the estimation results of equation (4) using OLS, household fixed 
effects, and fixed effects IV methods. In all specifications from (1) to (6), the necessary 
condition of full consumption risk sharing, which is represented by the null hypothesis that α1= 
-1, is rejected. Another joint hypothesis of full risk sharing is represented by the condition that 
α1= -1 and α2= 1. This joint hypothesis is also rejected, as we can see from specifications (2), (4), 
and (6). In sum, these estimation results suggest that the full consumption risk-sharing 
hypothesis does not hold.     
  It should be noted, however, the results are driven by the “unforeseen” nature of the   - 12 - 
damages caused by HPAI. Initially, HPAI was a totally unknown event to the households and 
thus it was natural to face it with a lack of formal or informal insurance mechanisms. Yet after a 
while, some insurance mechanism might have emerged. In order to examine such a possibility, 
we ran a IV-fixed effects model with only the sample of the second and third years. The result is 
shown in specification (7) of Table 9. Indeed the result indicates that the consumption 




Credit Market Accessibility 
In order to explore the reasons behind the rejection of the full consumption 
risk-sharing hypothesis, we employed the direct information on credit constraints. Following 
Scott (2000), we carefully designed the questionnaire so that the credit constraints can be 
identified directly from the dataset. In identifying credit constraints, household heads were 
asked about experiences of borrowing from informal sources such as relatives, friends, and 
neighbors during the past twelve months. We defined two indicator variables of credit 
constraints that were weak and strict versions of indicators.     
We first asked whether a household attempted to obtain a loan. Then, for those who 
tried to borrow money, we asked whether the household could borrow the total amount 
requested. If the answer was yes, we identified the household as being non-constrained. On the 
other hand, we identified those households whose loan requests were rejected or accepted on a 
partial-amount basis as being credit constrained. Second, for those who did not attempt to 
borrow, we asked the respondents about the reason for not availing themselves of the bank loans. 
Among the answer choices, those who selected “no need for credit” were considered as being 
unconstrained with regard to informal sources. This is the weak version of the credit constraint 
                                                  
2  However, we should also note that the fitness of the first-stage regression is not necessarily 
sufficient. Hence, the result should be treated as suggestive, not conclusive.     - 13 - 
indicator.   
In the second criteria of the strict constraint indicator, we defined credit unconstrained 
households simply as those who answered that they could borrow as much as they requested.  
According to our data, among 408 observations from 136 households, 229 (350) cases were 
identified to be credit-constrained and 179 (58) to be unconstrained in the weak (strict) sense, 
indicating that a significant portion of households are credit-constrained.     
We estimate the model of equation (4) for credit-constrained and unconstrained groups 
separately. We postulate an indicator function of credit constraints as cc=1[Zγ>u], where Z is a 
vector of determinants of credit constraints. Assuming that credit constraint is endogenous, the 
model is reduced to a Type II Tobit model applied to each group separately. We estimate the 
model using Heckman’s two step procedure with sample selection correction terms, φ(Zγ)/Φ(Zγ) 
and φ(Zγ)/[1-Φ(Zγ)] for the constrained and non-constrained groups, respectively, where φ(・) 
and Φ(・) are the density and cumulative density functions, respectively, of the standard normal 
distribution.
3 
The estimation results are shown in Table 10. In the weak criteria of the credit constraint, 
the consumption risk-sharing hypotheses are rejected in the cases of both constrained and 
non-constrained groups. On the contrary, as can be seen from specifications (6) and (7) in Table 
10, for the unconstrained group in the strict criteria of credit constraint, the two null hypotheses, 
H0:  α1= -1 and H0:  α1= -1 and α2= 1, cannot be rejected. These results indicate that the 
credit-unconstrained group effectively faces the full consumption insurance. In other words, 
these results suggest that violation of full consumption risk-sharing against HPAI may arise 
from credit market imperfections. 
 
Risk-Coping Strategies 
    Even though overall consumption risk-sharing is not necessarily effective, to some 
                                                  
3  We also corrected for the biases of variance-covariance matrices.   - 14 - 
extent households are capable of adopting a wide variety of risk-coping devices against negative 
shocks created by HPAI. We then investigated the relative effectiveness of households’ 
risk-coping mechanisms against different shocks. By doing so, we were able to identify the 
sources of incomplete risk sharing. Specifically, based on the reduced form of Equation (5) we 
applied the empirical model of Fafchamps and Lund (2003) to investigate how each household's 
risk-coping behavior responded against different negative shocks, such as health shocks, 
funerals and other ceremonial events, unexpected loss of livestock, and HPAI infection.   
    Table 11 represents the estimation results of each risk-coping equation. With respect to 
funeral and other ceremonial events, formal borrowings as well as private transfers were utilized 
significantly. Yet for the damages caused by HPAI, informal borrowings seemed to play an 
important role - sensitivity of the death of one chicken due to HPAI led to loan of 34,000 VND.
4  
However, other risk-coping strategies were largely ineffective against a variety of negative 
shocks. This may be seen as being consistent with the finding of the overall lack of full 
consumption risk-sharing in the dataset. 
   
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our empirical results imply a serious lack of formal and informal insurance 
mechanisms for damages caused by a wide variety of shocks. These findings are not surprising 
if we consider the low level of insurance market development in Vietnam. Moreover, there is no 
formal insurance mechanism available for unexpected events, such as HPAI and other natural 
disasters. Without effective ex ante measures, the actual welfare losses caused by disasters as 
enormous as HPAI prove to be extremely large for the government to support effectively.     
Our analysis contains two policy implications for preparing well-designed social 
safety nets against future natural disasters: first, when governments attempt to provide ex post 
                                                  
4  We also estimate an econometric model with year-specific coefficients for the HPAI damage 
variable. The result, however, rejects the heterogeneous response of informal borrowings for the 
later years.     - 15 - 
public support in the event of a natural disaster, they may create a moral hazard problem by 
encouraging people to expose themselves to greater risks than necessary. In this respect, we 
should also note that according to our results, the credit market imperfection is a possible source 
of violation of full consumption insurance. Hence, our empirical results suggest that providing 
victims with subsidized loans, rather than direct transfers, can be a good example of facilitating 
risk-coping behavior because such interventions are less likely to create serious moral hazard 
problems.   
Second, it is imperative to design ex ante risk-management policies against disasters 
including HPAI (Nakata and Sawada, 2008). The development of markets for index-type HPAI 
insurance, for example, would lead to the efficient pricing of insurance premiums. This 
development would generate proper incentives to invest in ex ante risk mitigations which are 
known to be very cost effective. Policy issues such as these will be important research topics in 
the future. A large, nationally representative dataset should be employed to investigate these 
issues.     - 16 - 
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Table 1 
Incidence of Natural Disasters in Vietnam by Province 
(Computed by VHLSS 2004) 
Province name  Average number 
of floods per 
community  
Average number 
of typhoons per 
community 
Average number 












Ha  Noi  0.091 0.000 0.136 0.227    0.909 
Hai  Phong  0.077 0.077 0.000 0.154    0.846 
Vinh  Phuc  0.455 0.227 0.091 0.773    0.773 
Ha  Tay  0.042 0.042 0.000 0.083    0.917 
Bac  Ninh  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.938 
Hai  Duong  0.273 0.030 0.000 0.303    0.939 
Hung  Yen  0.737 0.000 0.000 0.737    0.579 
Ha  Nam  0.000 0.063 0.000 0.063    0.875 
Nam  Dinh  0.658 0.158 0.026 0.842    0.605 
Thai  Binh  1.127 0.032 0.032 1.190    0.635 
Ninh  Binh  0.500 0.722 0.056 1.278    0.278 
Ha  Giang  0.429 0.524 0.238 1.190    0.762 
Cao  Bang  0.333 0.278 0.056 0.667    0.500 
Lao  Cai  0.111 0.333 0.000 0.444    0.333 
Bac  Can  0.294 0.235 0.059 0.588    0.235 
Lang  Son  0.263 0.316 0.368 0.947    0.579 
Tuyen  Quang  1.000 0.333 0.111 1.444    0.259 
Yen  Bai  0.524 0.190 0.095 0.810    0.619 
Thai  Nguyen  0.500 0.125 0.375 1.000    0.583 
Phu  Tho  0.333 0.667 0.111 1.111    0.333 
Bac  Giang  0.296 0.148 0.148 0.593    0.852 
Quang  Ninh  0.000 0.857 0.286 1.143    0.429 
Lai  Chau  0.458 0.250 0.250 0.958    0.583 
Dien  Bien  0.563 0.188 0.313 1.063    0.813 
Son  La  0.500 0.538 0.346 1.385    0.500 
Hoa  Binh  0.409 0.364 1.500 2.273    0.455 
Thanh  Hoa  0.310 0.379 0.241 0.931    0.552 
Nghe  An  0.533 0.111 0.378 1.022    0.444 
Ha  Tinh  0.536 0.071 0.429 1.036    0.357 
Quang  Binh  0.542 0.167 0.583 1.292    0.292 
Quang  Tri  0.211 0.263 0.526 1.000    0.789 
Hue  0.333 0.111 0.111 0.556    0.778 
Da  Nang  0.000 0.167 0.167 0.333    0.833 
Quang  Nam  0.500 0.143 0.393 1.036    0.714 
Quang  Ngai  0.895 0.421 0.263 1.579    0.632 
Binh  Dinh  1.244 0.707 0.244 2.195    0.488 
Phu  Yen  0.636 0.545 0.227 1.409    0.409 
Khanh  Hoa  0.526 0.316 0.316 1.158    0.789 
Kon  Tum  0.643 0.357 1.571 2.571    0.786 
Data) VHLSS 2004.   - 22 - 
Table 1 
Incidence of Natural Disasters in Vietnam by Province (continued) 
(Computed by VHLSS 2004) 
Province name  Average number 
of floods per 
community  
Average number 
of typhoons per 
community 
Average number 












Gia  Lai  0.385 0.308 0.654 1.346    0.538 
Dac  Lac  0.382 0.324 1.000 1.706    0.735 
Dac  Nong  0.000 0.083 0.625 0.708    0.333 
Lam  Dong  0.476 0.429 0.571 1.476    0.476 
Ho Chi Minh city  0.000  0.231  0.154  0.385    0.923 
Ninh  Thuan  0.857 0.095 0.429 1.381    0.619 
Binh  Phuoc  0.286 0.619 0.476 1.381    0.524 
Tay  Ninh  0.120 0.240 0.000 0.360    0.800 
Binh  Duong  0.000 0.091 0.000 0.091    1.000 
Dong  Nai  0.294 0.471 0.147 0.912    0.647 
Binh  Thuan  0.583 0.167 0.417 1.167    0.583 
Ba Ria - Vung Tau  0.000  0.238  0.000  0.238    0.952 
Long  An  0.231 0.051 0.103 0.385    0.974 
Dong  Thap  0.738 0.405 0.167 1.310    0.833 
An  Giang  0.727 0.295 0.023 1.045    0.682 
Tien  Giang  0.408 0.224 0.041 0.673    0.959 
Vinh  Long  0.139 0.222 0.028 0.389    0.972 
Ben  Tre  0.080 0.160 0.040 0.280    0.720 
Kien  Giang  0.500 0.750 0.000 1.250    0.583 
Can  Tho  0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000    0.778 
Hau  Giang  0.286 0.476 0.048 0.810    0.429 
Tra  Vinh  0.000 0.882 0.000 0.882    0.471 
Soc  Trang  0.138 0.276 0.069 0.483    0.862 
Bac  Lieu  0.000 0.348 0.000 0.348    0.826 
Ca Mau 
 
0.000 0.367 0.000 0.367    0.800 
 
Average in Vietnam 
 
0.375 0.292 0.235 0.902    0.656 
Data) VHLSS 2004. 




Age of the head (1st round) 41.2
Number of members (1st round) 4.75
    (Number)




Poverty card holders (1st and 2nd rd) 21 16.2%
Poverty card holders (3nd rd) 46 29.0%
Land usufruct right holder (1st rd) 127 93.4%
Land usufruct right holder (2st rd) 115 92.7%




Table 3   
Livestock Portfolio 
(Based on the 1





Water buffalo 1.31 1.76 0 20
Cow 0.29 1.83 0 25
Mother pig 0.50 0.96 0 11
Hog 3.19 4.42 0 45
Chicken for market 14.44 15.47 0 110
Chicken for eggs 5.62 6.07 0 50
Duck for market 6.37 11.33 0 100
Duck for eggs 1.13 5.74 0 100  
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Table 4   













(in 1, 000 VND;
subjective
assessments)
HPAI 19 16 11 800-1,000
Drought na 67 75
Sickness (serious) 4 3 3 2,000
Sickness (less serious) na 21 12 500-2,000
Typhoon na 28 25 500-
Flood na 5 5 500-2,000
Unemployment na 4 1




Incidence of HPAI 
1st round 2nd round 3rd round
First infection 19 7 1
Second infection 0 92
Third infection 0 0 8















Borrowing from formal sources (VBARD,VBSP) 66 6399.2 100 52000
Borrowing from informal sources 23 3404.8 260 39000
Borrowing from microfinance programs 51 1311.0 400 20000
Public transfers (exclusing HPAI related) 21 366.5 6 3000
Public transfers (HPAI related) 200 257.4 3 752
Private transfers 28 3494.9 -3500 20400
Income from daily casual work and crafting 170 5272.0 48 61200
Livestock income 34 5081.0 27 16300  
   - 25 - 
Table 7 








No 345 40 385 No 190 18 208
Yes 17 6 23 Yes 172 28 200
% Yes 4.9% 13.0% 6.0% % Yes 47.5% 60.9% 49.0%








No 318 39 357 No 333 41 374
Y e s 4 47 5 1 Y e s 2 95 3 4
% Yes 13.8% 17.9% 12.5% % Yes 8.0% 13.9% 8.3%








No 335 45 380 No 140 4 144
Yes 27 1 28 Yes 222 42 264
% Yes 8.1% 2.2% 6.9% % Yes 61.3% 91.3% 64.7%





No 346 41 387
Yes 16 5 21



















Note: Numbers in cells except percentages show numbers of observations.  Percentages represent 
the proportion of those who adopted each risk coping for each HPAI damage status. 
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Table 8 Determinants of HPAI damages 
 Dummy=1  if 
experienced HPAI 
Number of died chickens 
due to HPAI 
Value of loss due 
to HPAI 
Age -0.004  -0.146  -4.54 
 (0.005)  (0.175)  (5.39) 
Number of household members  0.034  0.921  28.971 
 (0.018)*  (0.686)  (21.12) 
Dummy=1 if poverty card holder  0.086  2.111  63.075 
 (0.045)*  (1.699)  (52.336) 
Dummy=1 if Land usufruct right holder  0.041  3.432  113.836 
 (0.155)  (5.822)  (179.314) 
Number of motorcycles  0.064  1.119  32.548 
 (0.058)  (2.196)  (67.642) 
Dummy=1 if own black and white TV  0.014  -2.828  -84.175 
 (0.07)  (2.654)  (81.744) 
Dummy=1 if own color TV  -0.07  -4.288  -131.325 
 (0.057)  (2.151)**  (66.257)** 
Dummy=1 if own radio  -0.07  0.362  8.619 
 (0.111)  (4.197)  (129.285) 
Dummy=1 if own tractor  -0.064  -0.0005  -3.036 
 (0.285)  (10.719)  (330.177) 
Dummy=1 if own refrigerator  0.098  -0.338  -17.966 
 (0.211)  (7.931)  (244.287) 
Dummy=1 if own phone  -0.022  4.03  119.403 
 (0.151)  (5.67)  (174.648) 
Dummy=1 if own fan  0.056  0.926  30.363 
 (0.052)  (1.953)  (60.158) 
Dummy=1 if own bicycle  -0.044  -0.422  -16.452 
 (0.063)  (2.367)  (72.905) 
Dummy=1 if own DVD  0.072  2.959  84.541 
 (0.157)  (5.895)  (181.564) 
Number of buffalos  -0.004  -0.378  -10.7 
 (0.012)  (0.453)  (13.959) 
Number of mother pigs  0.026  0.971  29.251 
 (0.018)  (0.666)  (20.511) 
Number of hogs    -0.003  -0.026  -0.812 
 (0.004)  (0.135)  (4.148) 
Number of chickens for market  -0.001  -0.072  -2.352 
 (0.001)  (0.046)  (1.413)* 
Number of chickens for eggs  0.0004  -0.097  -3.057 
 (0.003)  (0.124)  (3.818) 
Number of ducks for market  0.00008  0.002  0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.055)  (1.687) 
Number of ducks for eggs  0.0005  0.011  0.299 
 (0.003)  (0.097)  (3.002) 
Dummy=1 if 2
nd round  0.001  -1.079  -30.227 
 (0.033)  (1.24)  (38.18) 
Dummy=1 if 3
rd round  -0.067  -3.012  -82.05 
 (0.034)*  (1.277)**  (39.336)** 
Constant 0.051  5.042  147.533 
 (0.092)  -3.472  -106.93 
F statistics for the joint hypothesis of all 







Number of observations  408  408  408 
Number of households  136  136  136 
R-squared 0.07  0.09  0.09 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   - 27 - 
Table 9 Test of Full Consumption Risk Sharing [Equation (4)] 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Estimation Method OLS OLS  Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 


















+  -0.231 -0.244  -0.213 -0.233  0.561  0.358  -0.409 
(y-c
d) in 1,000 VND  (0.081)** (0.081)**  (0.093)** (0.092)**  (0.944)  (0.657)  (0.827) 
Dummy=1 if hit by HPAI  3,569.09   2,493.66   6,632.86     
  (1,542.006)*   (2,276.65)  (5,633.05)     
Damage amount by HPAI   2.234   0.381    2.207  -1.234 
(Δd) in 1,000 VND]   (1.534)   (1.923)    (2.886)  (3.777) 
              
F Statistics for the joint hypothesis, 
α1= -1 and α2= 1 
[p-value] 
  43.15 
[0.0000]    35.83 




              
Observations 408  408  408  408  408  408  272 
Number of households  136  136  136  136  136  136  136 
R-squared 
 
0.02 0.22  0.32 0.03  0.0070  0.0088 0.0375 
Note: We estimate Equation (4) and the left-side variables are in 1,000 VND.  Control variables whose results are not shown include age of the 
head, number of household members, dummy for poverty card holders, sex dummy of the head, education level of the head, working status of the 
head, and occupation dummy variables; Standard errors in parentheses.    + represents endogenous variable and instrumental variables are severe and 
moderate illness dummies, ceremonial event dummy, unexpected loss of livestock for market dummy, unexpected loss of livestock for reproduction 
dummy, number of died chickens due to HPAI, missing dummies for severe and moderate illness, and year dummy variables.    * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.   - 28 - 
Table 10 
Test of Full Consumption Risk Sharing by Credit Constraint Status   
[Equation (4)] 
 
   Weak Constraint       Strict Constraint   
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Biding credit constraint? 
 
YES NO  YES NO    YES  NO  YES  NO 
Income-durable expenditure
+  -0.0316 -0.358***  -0.0343 -0.383***    0.0438 -1.134***  0.0392 -1.178*** 
(y-c
d) in 1,000 VND  (0.101) (0.116)  (0.1)  (0.115)    (0.0679) (0.249)  (0.068)  (0.242) 
Dummy=1 if hit by HPAI  2242 4014*       2902** 5997     
  (1736) (2316)        (1313) (5211)     
Damage amount by HPAI     2.322  2.369       2.224*  4.483 
(Δd) in 1,000 VND     (1.791)  (2.26)       (1.329)  (5.003) 
Sample selection correction term  -3459* -1978  -3695* -2325    -1122 12601**  -1170 12315** 
  (1926) (2206)  (1952) (2209)    (2375) (5261)  (2416) (5279) 
                  
Chi-sq. statistics for the joint 
hypothesis, α1= -1 and α2= 1 
[p-value] 








                  
Observations 229  179  229  179    350  58  350  58 
R-squared 
 
0.02 0.22  0.32 0.03    0.0153  0.0429  0.0134  0.0412 
Note: We estimate Equation (4) and the left-side variables are in 1,000 VND.  Control variables whose results are not shown include age of the 
head, number of household members, dummy for poverty card holders, sex dummy of the head, education level of the head, working status of the 
head, and occupation dummy variables; Standard errors in parentheses.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.  - 29 - 
 
Table 11   

















              
Dummy=1 if serious illness  -707.20  69.16  -10.72  -31.40  -1.80  146.00  4.72 
 (2419.33)  (1232.64)  (14.63)  (91.29) (13.10) (116.95) (280.73) 
Dummy=1 if moderate illness  896.46  -133.41  0.34  44.45  2.13  14.83  -58.50 
  (970.24) (494.33) (5.87) (36.61)  (5.25)  (46.90)  (112.58) 
Dummy=1 if ceremony  2286.77  -47.51  -5.67  68.70  2.49  -39.85  80.48 
 (1,015.389)** (517.34)  (6.14)  (38.314)* (5.50)  (49.08)  (117.82) 
Dummy=1 if livestock for market was lost unexpectedly  -67.63  245.37  -8.86  3.77  0.52  13.17  93.81 
 (780.80)  (397.81)  (4.720)*  (29.46)  (4.23)  (37.74)  (90.60) 
Dummy=1 if livestock for reproduction was lost unexpectedly -1553.07  -603.21 10.35 -29.48  -5.05  108.96  58.12 
  (1433.73)  (730.48) (8.67) (54.10)  (7.76)  (69.30)  (166.37) 
Number of chickens died due to HPAI  -10.05  34.20  -0.16  0.22  -0.02  -1.84  4.02 
 (28.38)  (14.457)**  (0.17)  (1.07)  (0.15)  (1.37)  (3.29) 
              
Observations 408  408  408  408  408  408  408 
Number of fid  136  136  136  136  136  136  136 
R-squared 
 
0.23 0.24  0.12  0.23  0.04  0.17  0.21 
Note: All the estimations include household fixed effects based on Equation (5).    The left-side variables are in 1,000 VND.    Control variables whose results are not shown include 
age of the head, number of household members, dummy for poverty card holders, sex dummy of the head, education level of the head, working status of the head, and occupation 
dummy variables; Standard errors in parentheses; and * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 